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ABSTRACT
Possible benefits of tax reform include faster economic growth and
greater equity across households. A part of economic growth is the channeling
of saving into the most productive real investments. The ability of various
tax regimes to channel saving efficiently and independently of the inflation
rate is the focus of the current paper. The tax regimes include current law,
preERTA law, the Treasury and Administration reform proposals, HR 3838, and
what seems likely to come out of the Senate Finance Committee.
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One goal of tax policy is an efficient allocation of resources. From the
perspective of real capital, efficiency translates into the familiar "level
playing field" upon which different forms of capital investment would compete
on equal terms. A relevant question, then, is: will the changes in tax rates
and tax incentives embodied in the Treasury, Administration and House (HR 3838)
reform plans render the field more level? Because the slope of the playing
field under current law also depends on the level of inflation, a related
question is: will this slope's sensitivity to inflation be dampened or
exaggerated by the reforms? Providing answers to these questions is the
purpose of this paper. Along the way, I also take a brief look backward at the
impact of early 1980 tax changes and forward at the impact of the bill likely
to emerge from the Senate Finance Committee.
My analysis of the various tax reforms plans suggests that only the
Administration plan would create a more level playing field (a full version of
this analysis is contained in Hendershott, 1986) .Boththe Treasury plan and
the House bill would tilt the existing field toward owner—occupied housing, the
investment that is already most tax favored. In effect, we would return to the
pre—1981 world. The Administration plan, and the House bill to a lesser
extent, would also significantly reduce the sensitivity of the playing field to
inflation. The Treasury plan, in contrast, would increase the sensitivity, in
spite of its professed intent to do otherwise.—2—
THE ANNUAL RENTAL COST AND THE EFFICIENT ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL
A key determinant of investment in any type of capital good is its annual
rental cost. If the gross return from investment promises to exceed this cost,
then investment will occur. Because additional investment drives down the
gross return, eventually an equilibrium will be reached at which the gross
return from new investment equals the rental cost. Moreover, the higher is the
rental cost for any capital good, the higher will be the required gross return
and thus the less will be investment in the good in equilibrium.
In a world devoid of taxes and tax incentives, the annual rental cost or
investment hurdle rate is simply the real interest rate, including the risk
premium relevant to the asset, plus economic depreciation. The higher is the
risk premium an asset must promise and the greater is its anticipated rate of
depreciation, the higher is the hurdle rate and thus the required gross return.
But this is only appropriate: assets that are riskier and wear out faster
should promise greater returns to compensate for their greater risk and more
rapid deterioration. The zero tax and tax—incentive world would yield a level
playing field, i.e., one in which the risk—adjusted net (of depreciation)
rental costs for all investments are equal.
Our actual world contains numerous taxes and tax incentives. The
'effective tax rates" for alternative investments, plus differences in the
financing and riskiness of the investments, tilt the playing field in various
directions. The tilts, in turn, cause overinvestment in some capital goods and
underinvestment in others. The result is a lower average return on capital
than would exist with the optimal allocation of capital and a reduction in the
national standard of living. The reduction is labeled an efficiency loss.—3—
THE PLAYING FIELD UNDER CURRENT LAW
The risk—adjusted net rental costs for seven capital classes are listed
in Table 1 for five tax regimes: current law, the November 1984 Treasury plan,
the May 1985 Administration plan, HR 3838 passed in December 1985 and the
'Senate Finance Committee Bill'. There are four corporate asset classes
——PLACE TABLE 1 HERE——
(inventories, equipment, public utility structures and industrial structures)
and three noncorporate real estate assets (depreciable rental and commercial
structures, owner—occupied housing of households with adjusted gross incomes
under 50,000 1985 dollars, and owner—occupied housing of households with
incomes over $50,000) .Twononcorporate equipment categories are also included
for the Senate Bill. The calculations for current law assume a five percent
inflation rate and a ten percent debt rate and have been adjusted to the
presumed risk of owner—occupied housing. Other important assumptions are noted
below.
As can be seen, the adjusted net rental costs or investment hurdle rates
vary widely across corporate assets under current law, with inventories having
the highest and utilities and, especially, equipment the lowest. The
differences are easily explained. Inventories are subject to a special
inflation tax, owing to FIFO accounting, and utilities and equipment benefit
from a special tax break, the investment tax credit. Because a given
percentage credit is more beneficial the shorter the life of the asset, the
credit lowers the cost for equipment more than the cost for utilities.
The hurdle rate for depreciable real estate structures is far less than
that for corporate industrial structures. In addition to the double—taxation
of corporate income, the difference reflects discrimination in the current
system against riskier, more equity financed investments and the lower risk and
greater debt associated with real estate investments) More specifically, the—4—
calculations are based on a one—third debt—to—value ratio and a 5 percent risk
premium for corporate investments versus a two—thirds debt—to—value ratio and
2½ percent risk premium for depreciable real estate.
The hurdle rates for owner—occupied housing are the lowest, reflecting
the absence of taxation of the returns from this asset. (These calculations
are independent of the assumed risk premium and, under current law, are largely
independent of the assumed loan—to—value ratio.) The advantage of the
nontaxation is, of course, greater the higher the tax bracket of the homeowner.
For simplicity, owners have been divided into only two classes, those with
incomes above and below $50,000. The hurdle rates for these classes are rough
weighted averages of owners within each of these classes, the weights depending
on the relative quantities of housing the owners demand.
A comparison of the risk—adjusted net costs under current law suggests
two ways to produce a more level playing field. First, the general advantage
of real estate, especially owner—occupied housing of higher income households,
can be lessened. (While a plausible case can be made for tax incentives to
encourage homeownership, a persuasive case for subsidizing owners to occupy
larger houses has not been made.) Second, the disparity of costs across
corporate assets can be reduced. In the context of the first way, this largely
means lowering the costs of other corporate assets to that of equipment, not
raising the latter to the former; the often—noted bias in favor of equipment
under current law, while large relative to other corporate investments, is
small relative to capital investments generally.
THE TREASURY, ADMINISTRATION AND HOUSE TAX REFORMS
Proposed tax reforms generally treat capital income less favorably than
does current law: the investment tax credit is dropped in all proposals,
depreciation allowances are less generous in most cases, and the tax rate at—5.-
which real estate expenses are deductible would decline underevery reform. As
a result, aggregate investment demand would fall if the existing level of
interest rates continued. I have constructed a model in which the interest
rate declines just enough to maintain aggregate investment demand. This
interest rate level is shown at the bottom of Table 1, and the adjusted net
rental costs listed in the Table for the various reforms are based upon the new
lower level. This procedure makes the general level of adjusted net costs in
any column comparable to that in any other column. If the costs were computed
with the initial 10 percent level of interest rates, all the numbers in each
column would be increased, the increase being larger the further 10 percent is
above the interest rate in the bottom row. However, the relationship between
the numbers in any column ——theslope of the playing field ——wouldchange
little for the Administration and House reforms, and the differences across the
numbers for the Treasury plan would be even greater.
The Treasury plan attempts to neutralize the tax system for inflation by
indexing everything. Only real capital gains, including those on inventories,
would be taxed; depreciation would be on a replacement, rather than historic,
cost basis; and only the "real' part of interest expense would be taxed and
could be deducted (except all mortgage interest on one's principal residence
would remain deductible) .TheTreasury plan also attempts to tax all assets
and business forms (except owner—occupied housing) equally. To this end, tax
depreciation for each depreciable asset would equal the Treasury's best
estimate of true economic depreciation; the investment tax credit would be
dropped; real capital gains would be taxed at the regular income tax rate;
and half of corporate dividends would be deductible at the corporate level. As
the data in Table 1 show, the indexation of inventory gains, the removal of the—6—
tax credit, and the proposed tax depreciation treatment would vastly narrow the
risk—adjusted net costs across corporate assets. Also the partial dividend
exclusion would reduce the double taxation of corporate investments.
While the Treasury plan scores high in reducing the disparities across
corporate investments ——andin reducing the disparities across industries
within the corporate sector, although I do not illustrate this point here ——
theplan fails to reduce the advantages of real estate. In fact, the relative
advantage of owner—occupied housing rises by nearly a quarter. Under current
law the difference between the average net costs for corporate and owner—
housing capital is about 4 percentage points (0.067—0.026) ;withthe Treasury
plan the difference rises to 5¼ points (0.069—0.016) .Becauseowner—occupied
housing is currently the most tax—favored asset, the added efficiency loss from
enlarging this bias swamps the efficiency gain from better allocation across
2
corporate assets.
The Administration plan retreats from the general principles of the
Treasury plan in significant respects: all interest would continue to be
deductible; investors in nondepreciable assets would have the option of paying
taxes on nominal capital gains at one—half of the regular income tax rate; tax
depreciation would exceed economic depreciation; only one—tenth of dividends
would be deductible; and, in order to make the plan revenue neutral, inventory
gains would continue to be nonindexed. Tax depreciation would be especially
generous for equipment that continues to be classified as 3 or 5 years and for
public utility structures; allowable depreciation would exceed that under
current law even at zero inflation. However, most 5—year equipment would be
reclassified as 6,7 and even 10 year equipment. As a result, biases against
inventories and in favor of equipment would remain, although at much reduced
levels. Moreover, the Administration plan would reduce the general bias—7—
against corporate investments and in favor of owner—occupied housing,
especially that of higher income households. Overall, a more level playing
field and efficient allocation of capital would result.
The House bill removes the investment tax credit and substantially
lengthens depreciation schedules for structures. The resulting impact on
adjusted net rental costs would be remarkably similar to that of the Treasury
plan. Moreover, because far less base broadening would occur than under the
Treasury and Administration plans (most importantly, state and local taxes
would continue to be fully deductible), marginal tax rates for most homeowners
with incomes between $40,000 and $90,000 would not decline relative to current
law (Hendershott and Ling 1986) and thus neither would the absolute advantage
of owner—occupied housing. The disparity among corporate net rental costs
would narrow sharply, but these costs would be at a high level, while costs for
owner—occupied housing would decline from their already low levels. Again a
generally less level field and less efficient allocation of capital would
result.
THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE
At this point (mid April), the final version of the Committee bill is far
from certain. In these calculations I have assumed the original 'Packwood"
investment incentives: ACRS depreciation schedules (with 3 percent indexation
——5percent inflation less the 2 percent threshold) ,30year straight—line
depreciation for structures, and no investment tax credit. To account for the
higher $50,000 expensing provision for equipment, two additional capital
categories have been included in Table 1; both are noncorporate equipment, one
with five—year ACRS depreciation and the other with complete expensing.—8—
For owner—occupied housing, two alternatives are analyzed. The first
assumes that tax revenues are increased by raising some excise taxes and
eliminating the deductibility of excise taxes and tariffs. With this revenue,
a significant reduction in marginal household tax rates is possible; the
reduction is assumed to be the same as that generated in the Administration
plan. In the second, no additional tax revenues from excise taxes and tariffs
are assumed and thus no significant rate reduction is possible; the marginal
household tax rates here are taken to be the same as those in the House bill.
The difference between my Administration and House variants of the Senate
Finance Committee bill is clear; the sharply higher marginal tax rates for
owners in the $50,000 to $100,000 income range under the House bill increases
the tax advantage to owner—occupied housing and thus lowers its net rental
cost. In contrast, the costs for capital other than owner—occupied housing
rise slightly. It is also useful to compare the Senate Finance Committee
variants with their pure Administration/House counterparts. Relative to the
Administration plan, the Senate variant is less favorable to structures,
including depreciable real estate, and public utilities and more favorable to
owner—occupied housing. Relative to the House bill, the other Senate variant
is also less favorable to structures, but it is more favorable to equipment and
public utilities (offsetting some of the impact of the removal of the
investment tax credit) and less favorable to owner—occupied housing.
WHAT ERTA/TEFRA WROUGHT
The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 roughly halved depreciation tax
lives. Together with the existing investment tax credit, this created negative
effective tax rates for equipment, although the 1982 Act, which reduced the
depreciable base for equipment by one—half the investment tax credit (and
reneged on promised more accelerated depreciation methods in 1985) ,gotthe tax—9---
rates back into the positive zone. Because ERTA/TEFRA were so maligned for the
biased (toward equipment) playing field they created (see Gravelle 1982, for
example) ,itis perhaps useful to revisit the impact of the early 1980 tax
changes.
Table 2 contains risk—adjusted net rental costs both before and after
ERTA/TEFRA. The expected long—run inflation rate at the time of enactment is
presumed to have been 8 percent and the level of interest rates associated with
-—PLACETABLE 2 HERE —-
thatis taken to be 13 percent. Comparing the pre and post ERTA/TEFRAnumbers,
we do see a marked reduction in the hurdle rate for equipment relative to other
corporate investments: 3½ points vis—a—vis inventories, 2 points relative to
public utilities and one point more than structures. On the other hand, what
had been a large bias in favor of owner—occupied housing was sharply reduced.
The 'average" gap between hurdle rates on corporate capital andowner—occupied
housing was lowered from roughly 6 points (0.07 less 0.01) to about 3½ points
(0.06 less 0.025)
ERTA/TEFRA, then, reduced the efficiency of the allocation within the
corporate sector but increased the efficiency of allocation between owner—
occupied housing and the corporate sector. Given the large bias toward owner—
occupied housing prior to ERTA/TEFRA, overall capital would likely be allocated
more efficiently post than pre ERTA/TEFRA. The principal deficiency of both
the Treasury Plan and the House Bill, from the capital efficiencyperspective,
is their tendency to reestablish the large bias in favor ofowner—occupied
housing (compare the net adjusted hurdle rate for owner—occupied housing in
Tables 1 and 2).—10—
INFLATION NEUTRALITY
The inflation neutrality of the various tax regimes is examined by
computing the changes in the adjusted net rental costs that would occur as
inflation rises from zero to ten percent. The model—computed change in the
level of interest rates accompanying the 0.10 rise in inflation is listed in
the last row of Table 3. Under current law (and the Administration and House
reforms) ,interestrates rise by about 1.4 times the increase in inflation
——PLACETABLE 3 HERE —-
becausenominal, rather than real, interest is taxed and deducted; with the
1.4 increase, the general level of rental costs that evolves maintains
aggregate investment. With perfect interest indexation (the taxation and
deduction of real interest only) ,interestrates would rise one—for—one with
the increase in inflation. The rate increase is 1.15—for-one under the
Treasury plan because two flaws in its indexation feature would continue to
allow deduction of part of the inflation premium in interest rates. First, the
indexation presumes a 6 percent real interest rate, a level that is probably
too high even under current tax law and would certainly be far too high after
interest rates declined in response to the adoption of indexation. Second,
mortgage interest expense on one's principal residence would continue to be
fully deductible under the Treasury plan.
Two sources of bias in current tax law, the advantage of debt and the
double—taxation disadvantage of corporate ownership, are aggrevated by
inflation. Thus inflation favors depreciable real estate and high—income
owner—occupied housing, which are heavily debt—financed and not corporate
owned, and disfavors heavily equity—financed corporate investments. Lower—
income owner housing is also disfavored because the owners deduct interest at a
low tax rate and do not have an advantage from debt financing. With a marginal
tax rate of 0.2, the real after—tax debt rate rises from 2½ percent at a zero—11—
inflation rate to 4 percent at a ten percent rate. In contrast, with a 0.4 tax
rate, the real—after tax rate would decline from 1 and 3/4 percent to
percent.
Full interest indexation and integration of corporate and personal taxes
would eliminate the disadvantages to both equity finance and corporate
ownership. Because aggrevation of these biases is the source of inflation
nonneutrality under current law, one would expect the Treasury plan to be more
inflation neutral than current law. Unfortunately, imperfections in the
Treasury plan, particularly the exclusion of home mortgage interest expense
from the indexation provision, render the plan more inflation sensitive. While
the large advantage to depreciable real estate is removed, the advantage to
owner—occupied housing is increased. With the much smaller increase in nominal
interest rates and the continued full deductibility of interestpayments, the
real after—tax mortgage rate declines as inflation accelerates, even forowners
in the 0.2 tax bracket. The other side of the coin is higher costs for
corporate investments. Note, however, that the different types of corporate
investment are affected equally (badly) by inflation.
The Administration plan, in contrast, would be more inflation neutral
than current law. The two inflation—favored investments under currentlaw,
depreciable real estate and owner—occupied housing of high—income households,
would be less favored.This follows from the reduction in tax rates which
lowers the advantage of debt. With the exception of inventories, which would
still be subject to the inflation tax, corporate costs would be quite
insensitive to inflation. (This would also be true of inventory costs if
revenue—neutrality had not caused the inflation tax to be maintained.)
The House bill, too, would reduce the inflation biases existing in
current law, although by less than the Administration plan. Again, the two
most inflation—favored investments under current law would be less favored, but—12--
the increase in thecostfor high—income owner—occupied housing is limited.
The small increase relative to the Administration plan follows from differences
in the marginal tax rate at which owners in the $50,000 to $100,000 income
range would deduct mortgage interest. Under the House bill, this tax rate
would rise by 2 percentage points, tending to lower the after—tax mortgage
rate; in contrast, this tax rate would decline by 6½ points under the
Administration plan.
CONCLUS ION
Possible benefits of tax reform include faster economic growth and
greater equity. A part of economic growth is the channeling of saving into the
most productive real investments. The ability of various tax regimes to
channel saving efficiently and independently of the inflation rate has been the
focus of the current paper.
On the basis of this single criterion, the May 1985 Administration
proposal is superior to current law, the Treasury proposal of November 1984,
HR 3838 passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in December 1985, and what
seems likely to come out of the Senate Finance Committee. Efficient capital
investment requires that the risk—adjusted net (of depreciation) rental costs
of all capital goods be equal. The Administration plan would reduce both the
disparity of these costs across corporate investments and the gap between the
average costs for corporate investments and owner—occupied housing. While the
Treasury plan and House bill would narrow the differences in rental costs
across corporate assets even more than the Administration plan would, these
reforms (and the likely Senate Finance Committee legislation) would greatly
increase the bias in favor of owner—occupied housing. In fact, this bias is
likely to be as great as it was prior to ERTA. As a result, saving would be
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1. These calculations are somewhat controversial because the impacts of double
taxation and the riskiness of investments on relative hurdle rates are
uncertain. If the personal tax rate on share returns is taken to be a 40/60
weighted average of the tax rates on dividends and capital gains, the 40
reflecting the percentage of real corporate earnings that historically have
been paid out, then double taxation causes a large wedge in hurdle rates. In
contrast, if a 10/90 weighted average is employed, reflecting the proportion of
equity capital raised by new share issues rather than retained earnings the
wedge is much smaller (Auerbach 1983, 918—926) .Similarly,if one accepts the
analysis of Bulow and Summers (1984) ,riskcreates a large wedge, but this is
not true under the framework of Gordon and Wilson (1986) .Anintermediate
wedge, based upon a 10/90 dividend/capital gains tax assumption and the Bulow—
Summers analysis, is built into the estimates in Table 1.
2. These conclusions regarding the Treasury plan differ from those of Fullerton
and Henderson (1986, Table 5) who find that the relative advantage to owner—
occupied housing would rise only half as much. The differences in the two
studies is largely attributable to different assumptions regarding home
mortgage financing. Because mortgage interest expense would be fully
deductible but mortgage (bond) interest income would be only partially taxed, I
have assumed that households would raise their loan—to—value ratios from 67
percent to 85 percent. The gain from this pure tax arbitrage ——issuing
mortgage debt and investing in GNMA securities ——isan effective reduction in
the rental cost of housing, the collateral of which is needed for the
arbitrage. Fullerton and Henderson assume a base case loan—to—value ratio of
only 33 percent and no increase in response to the Treasury plan.(When I—17---
analyze the Treasury plan with full interest indexation ——homemortgage
interest, too, is only partially deductible ——therelative advantage to
owner—occupied housing increases by only 1/3 percentage point.)—18—
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